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[rpd] IPv4 Soft Landing BIS

Owen DeLong owen at
Mon Jul 31 17:52:29 UTC 2017

>>>> combined with the failure to implement IPv6
>>>> at a similar level because it has the same kind of cost-shifting effect.
>>>>> But using your analogy, please help me understand how the two liken,
>>>>> who is dumping what on who, and which side is facing any costs as a
>>>>> result.
>>>> By failing to implement IPv6 and continuing to operate IPv4 only, an organization is
>>>> forcing everyone else that wants to communicate with them to continue to maintain and
>>>> in some cases expand their own IPv4 infrastructure at an ever increasing cost, much the
>>>> way that those dumping toxic waste were saving money by not paying for hazmat disposal
>>>> while shifting costs on to the downstream public in the form of medical bills, cleanup
>>>> costs, etc.
>>> I actually agree with this. On the flip side though, is it not just as toxic if we do not ensure that new entrants have at least limited access to IPv4 resources to reach the legacy internet from their IPv6 networks without having to resort to the (out of region) transfer market?
>> Not at all. New entrants are facing increased costs to communicate with the IPv4 internet, but these are not costs shifted on to them by the malfeasance of others. They are the rising cost of a limited resource running out. Further, these costs are predictable and mostly a one-time expense where the costs being shifted above are unpredictable and recurring until such time as these other entities implement IPv6. 
> I don't think I follow here - why does the new operator going to the transfer market result in a predictable and mostly one-time cost, but the existing operator doing the same results in unpredictable and recurring costs?

It’s not the existing operator doing the same in this case.

The new operator is faced with the cost of acquiring IPv4 resources. The existing operator is faced with the costs of continuing to operate and expand an infrastructure built on fragile and brittle technologies like CGN.

Further, the new entrant is a single operator. However, operators that fail to deploy IPv6 are inflicting these costs on ALL operators who have customers that desire to connect to this operator that fails to deploy IPv6.

In this way, there’s not only a cost-shifting going on, but also a cost-multiplier.

>> But that isn't what we are talking about here. What we are talking about is really should an existing provider be forced to pay a higher price for addresses in the transfer market in order to preserve and effectively subsidize possible future competitors ability to obtain addresses at a lower cost?
> Actually, nobody is subsidizing anyone. The bill comes due, for everyone - existing and new operator alike. If the new operator requires more than a /22 he's going to have to go to the transfer market, just like the existing operator. 

Nope… Not under the proposed policy. Under the proposed policy, space is set aside for new operators and held out of reach of existing operators. Therefore the existing operators must pay higher transfer-market rates for their IPv4 addresses even if all he needs is another /22. This is, in effect, a forced subsidy from the existing operators to support cheap addresses for new operators.

>> So it is your opinion that we need a "Robin Hood" policy that effectively takes money from existing operators (by prematurely forcing them to the transfer market) in order to subsidize cheaper addresses for possible future competitors. 
> No, that is not my opinion. My opinion is that we need a policy that stops greedy corporates gobbling up our last IPv4 space, without any thought further than the buck they can make off that IPv4 space now. We need a policy that protects the ability of those who deploy IPv6 networks off the bat to be able to access the IPv4 internet. We need a policy that does not undermine the not unsubstantial non-commercial internet initiatives on this continent to protect corporate greed. What you are arguing does none of that, protects the corporate balance sheet in the here-and-now, but does absolutely nothing to ensure universal internet access provisioning in Africa.   

Then write such a policy. This policy as written does what I described above. It is a “Robin Hood” policy.

> As an example: There is a residential ISP in South Africa who has over 500 IPv4 prefixes. How many IPv6 prefixes do they announce? None. ZERO. You are saying that this operator should be allowed as much more IPv4 space as they can get, until it runs out, and tough luck to the new IPv6 operator down the line who needs IPv4 to connect to the legacy Internet. I'm sorry, I can not, and won't support the continued distribution of IPv4 resources to existing operators to maintain the IPv4 status quo.

Not at all… If you want to write a policy that resolves this issue without the other baggage and problems present in this policy, I would support a clean policy designed to address that issue and make space available to ANYONE specifically for IPv6 to IPv4 connectivity/transition. In fact, I wrote such a policy in the ARIN region years ago and it is now NRPM section 4.10 in the ARIN region.

> I disagree with your argument that this taxes the existing operator to subsidize the new entrant. If anything, this places an additional tax on new entrants because the existing operators are dragging their heels in deploying IPv6. In keeping with the "Robin Hood" theme, is that not a "Prince John" policy?

I’m all for any policy proposal that incentivizes existing providers deploying IPv6 and possibly any reasonable policy that penalizes them for failing to do so. Propose such a policy and if I believe it meets this intent you will see me supporting it. This proposed policy wouldn’t do anything to address that concern.

>> I suppose if that is your intent, then supporting this proposal makes sense. However, I consider that to be a form of graft and I cannot support it. 
> I have to admit I tried to make the connection to graft here, and failed miserably. Can you explain how anyone is benefitting untowardly here? 

Well, since you don’t believe that the subsidies occur under this policy as I described them (really, they do, but you will believe what you will believe), I can understand how you don’t see the graft. However, if you accept that the subsidies I described are, in fact, real, then you can see how I would consider them a form of graft. We are literally
in effect stealing from existing providers in order to support imaginary future providers. (Yes, some of them will become real, but we don’t know how many or over what time and as of today, they are all, in fact, imaginary and even, dare I say, vaporware).


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