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<p dir="auto">Good day Zimkhitha,</p>
<p dir="auto">On 19 Jul 2026, at 22:28, Zimkhitha Mguqulwa via RPD wrote:</p>
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<p dir="auto">These are just genuine questions rather than objections. I think any sort of discussions around these points would help me and potentially others better understand whether the proposal is the most appropriate solution.</p>
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<p dir="auto">Yes, genuine questions are welcomed!</p>
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<p dir="auto">My first question links to the existing AS-SETs. To my understanding (correct me if im wrong), the proposal only applies to newly created objects, which i would assume leaves existing names unchanged. If that is correct, how would the proposal deal with or rather address current cases of name squatting or any existing naming conflicts. Would it not be beneficial to resolve existing issues first rather than preventing new occurrences?</p>
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<p dir="auto">Sections 7.8.4–7.8.6 are leaving the existing AS-SETs alone as there aren’t a simple method to know which ASN owns which existing AS-SET.<br>
“Fixing exisitng issues” is not a AfriNIC only issue, and one registry can’t force another to make changes and the victims can’t change anything done by the squaters. What AfriNIC (and other with the same policies) will do by implementing this policy, is to prevent future collisions from happening inside their own whois databases - ie. be Good Netizens :)</p>
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<p dir="auto">Secondly, I was also wondering whether any tests or assessments have been done on operational impact for network operators. Has any implementation experience or impact assessments been shared from other regions that have adopted a similar approach to study how the progress or changes?</p>
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<p dir="auto">The Proposal actually do mention all the other RIRs’ already active implementation status, and the tools (like bgp4) already handle it correctly with not operational impacts reported and the rest are also documented in the proposal</p>
<p dir="auto">your question does overlap with the objectors, and for the record I’ll note that the objectors have two concrete questions they haven’t answered themselves:<br>
(a) What should filter-generators (like bgp4) do when some (nefarious?) reason an empty AS-GOOGLE appear in AfriNIC’s database vs RADB’s populated AS-GOOGLE ?<br>
(b) Under the proposed 'less restrictive alternatives', what remedy does a victim of AS-SET name squatting have to get the squatted object removed from a database they don't control?</p>
<p dir="auto">Both questions await answers.</p>
<p dir="auto">For documented harm, the record already holds it: the MANRS AS-AMAZON incident (2022), and the empty AS-GOOGLE in the RIPE DB that Frank showed side-by-side with RADB's populated one.<br>
And for the record: the distinction between authenticating creation and validating membership has been agreed by the opposers themselves, and is consistent with the proposal's stated scope — the proposal claims nothing about membership content.</p>
<p dir="auto">A practical example using my own ASN: today anyone — you, me, or a bad actor — can create AS-AMAZON or AS-GOOGLE in the open namespace, innocently or maliciously. Under this policy I could only create AS329532:AS-SOMETHING, because creation requires the maintainer credentials of AS329532. It is then always known which ASN holder created a set, and nobody can occupy a name under someone else's ASN.dentials of AS329532 — so it's always known which ASN holder created a set, and nobody can occupy a name under someone else's ASN.</p>
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