[rpd] Updated Proposal - AfriNIC Policy Compliance Dashboard AFPUB-2026-GEN-002-DRAFT02

[Tshepo Masuku]

Jordi,

I won’t argue this inside your frame, because the frame is the problem.

I do not accept policy-making by a self-selected group as a mandate to govern a continent or supervise operators’ businesses. Calling something “community policy” does not establish the legitimacy of the authority it claims. The distinction between participation in an administrative process and representation of everyone affected by it is important.

A registry records; it does not enforce. AFRINIC’s proper function is administrative: it keeps accurate records of who holds which number resources and executes transfers under defined procedures. That is an address book. Examining how a holder runs its network, imposing penalties, or withholding an address to punish conduct is enforcement. In fact, that function is placed with the appropriate sovereign authorities, not with a voluntary registry acting as police, prosecutor and judge. A registry that attempts this undermines its legitimacy rather than strengthening it.

Nothing you have cited resolves that objection. The Assisted Review page describes both routine registry-data checks and extended reviews that may request utilisation details and evidence of network operations. It also reproduces RSA language concerning reviews of already-assigned resources. That establishes what AFRINIC claims to do; it does not establish why we should accept that supervisory mandate or endorse it through DRAFT02. The extension from maintaining records to examining resource use is precisely what we reject.

Nor does community consensus confer sovereignty. AFRINIC’s PDP uses consensus, but agreement among participants is not a mandate from every operator, every member or every person across the service region. A self-selected policy forum is not a continent. A service region is not a sovereign people; a mailing list is not a legislature. Community participation does not convert an administrative function into authority over how address holders run their businesses.

So the position stands: I do not accept a general audit or enforcement mandate over how holders use their number resources, and we oppose DRAFT02 being used to create, expand or endorse one. Describing supervision as “policy compliance” does not change its nature.

The dashboard is not presented solely as recordkeeping. Paragraph 4 connects findings to investigation, service withholding, revocation and membership closure. Its appendix illustrates public listing, NS-record removal, recovery and deletion of holder records. Although those appendix provisions are examples rather than automatic operative deadlines, they show the enforcement model being contemplated. The authority for that model must be justified, not assumed.

To converge, put it on the table: the exact instrument relied upon for resource-use audits, the grounds for initiating them, and the limits on information or access demanded. Identifying a clause that asserts a power is not the same as establishing why that power should be endorsed.

DRAFT02 should expressly state:
This section shall neither create, expand nor endorse a general power to audit operators’ use of already-held number resources, whether through network access or documentary demands. Dashboard checks shall be limited to objectively verifiable registry facts necessary for uniqueness, accurate records and recognised control.

Limiting an audit to documents changes the method, not the mandate. The mandate itself is what we do not accept.

Regards,
Tshepo

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