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[rpd] New Draft Policy Proposal - Amendment of the PDP Working Group (WG) Guidelines and Procedures AFPUB-2026-GEN-001-DRAFT01.
Seun Ojedeji
seun.ojedeji at gmail.com
Tue Jun 23 22:46:54 UTC 2026
Hello Andrew,
While I expect a responsible Board would provide detailed reasons for
refusing to ratify a policy proposal, I understand that the current Bylaw
and CPM do not mandate an explanation. Hence, I agree it is worth
incorporating that requirement into the bylaw.
On a related note, the recently published staff assessment of this proposal
(especially the legal section) aligns closely with my concerns; therefore,
I do not support the proposal in its current form
Regards
On Tue, 23 Jun 2026 at 07:43, Andrew Alston <aa at alstonnetworks.net> wrote:
> To add a bit to what Seun said, though I largely agree with everything he
> mentioned. I write this in my personal capacity.
>
> The PDP sets the operational rules; the bylaws set the governance rules.
> The bylaws may make reference to the PDP to strengthen it, but should not.
> contain things of an operational nature.Similarly, the PDP cannot function
> as a board; it lacks fiduciary responsibility - that lies with the
> directors.
>
> In my view, the role of the PDP chairs is to judge consensus, and in some
> cases to encourage people to come together to find consensus. It is not
> the job of the PDP chairs to force consensus, It needs to also be
> understood that a failure to reach consensus in the PDP is not a failure of
> the system, it merely means that the community does not agree on a
> particular way forward, and that is fine.
>
> If I look at the IETF processes and procedures, which I believe are some
> of the strongest and most well tested set, the working group chairs make
> judgement calls on if there is rough consensus, first at the adoption stage
> of a document, and then at last call for the document. After that, it
> moves to the Area Directors, first to put it through IETF wide last call,
> then, once it passes IETF wide last call, to the IESG to ballot on. IESG
> balloting on any proposal has 3 options.
>
> a.) A 'discuss' position is a blocking ballot, meaning an Area Director
> wants to discuss and resolve certain issues. It is not designed so that
> the Area Directors or the IESG can override community consensus.
> b.) A 'no objection' position. This means the Area Director has read the
> document and has no objections to its contents
> c.) A 'YES' position. This indicates strong support from a particular
> Area Director and is the default position for an Area Director when they
> move a document out of working group to the IESG for balloting.
> d.) An 'Abstain' position. An abstention ballot reduces the quorum
> required to pass a document.
>
> To put this into a PDP context, the PDP chairs act in a similar role as
> working group chairs do in the IETF. The board currently acts in an
> equivelant role to the IESG. That being said, there is a key difference:
> the board currently has the right to refuse to ratify policy without
> reason. It may be worth while considering a similar structure when it
> comes to ratification of PDP policies, where the board ballots along
> similar lines. Of course this would be a pretty unique way for an RIR to
> function, but it has worked well at an IETF level for more than 30 years.
> The advantage of this is that any refusal to ratify policy places an
> obligation on the individual who is blocking the ballot to have a
> discussion to attempt to resolve and find a way forward to meet community
> consensus.
>
> Just my thoughts
>
> Andrew
>
>
>
> On Tue, Jun 23, 2026 at 4:50 AM Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Hello Musa,
>>
>> I think I have tried to be as clear on my concerns as possible but see
>> further response inline which I hope further put clarity to my concern.
>>
>> ----
>> Sent from my mobile
>> kindly excuse typos
>>
>> On Tue, 23 Jun 2026, 12:50 am Musa Stephen Honlue, <honlue at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 22 Jun 2026, at 21:48, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hello PDWG,
>>>
>>> ----
>>> Sent from my mobile
>>> kindly excuse typos
>>>
>>> On Mon, 22 Jun 2026, 8:21 pm ALAIN AINA via RPD, <rpd at afrinic.net>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hello PDWG,
>>>>
>>>> > On 20 Jun 2026, at 23:25, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji at gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>> >
>>>> > Hello Gregoire,
>>>> >
>>>> > Thanks for putting those references, you will find that referenced
>>>> roles and responsibility from other RIRs and our current PDP puts some
>>>> trust in the chair(s) to do the needful based on expected outcome.
>>>> >
>>>> > IMO 3.3.2.1 e,f,g,I are currently worded in much granular manner.
>>>> Take f for instance, why won't the Co-Chairs read presentation, so what
>>>> happens if the Co-Chair missed reading the presentation or if they did but
>>>> someone within the PDWG claim they didn't.
>>>> >
>>>> > The text Preceding 3.3.2.1 addresses a lot of the granularity of
>>>> 3.3.2.1:
>>>> >
>>>> > "Organise, prepare and chair the face-to-face and on-line formal
>>>> working group meetings as well as community consultation meetings."
>>>>
>>>> If there is consensus that the co‑chairs’ roles and responsibilities
>>>> must be explicitly defined, the next step is to agree on the precise
>>>> wording. We invite others in the community to share their perspectives and
>>>> suggestions
>>>> >
>>>> > That said, please do not loose sight of the main concerns that I have
>>>> raised already. One of them is that we need to be clear on what problem we
>>>> are trying to address. The problems stated in the current proposal are not
>>>> problems unique to PDWG, they are organisational problems and PDWG was
>>>> rightly affected by them just like the other part of the org was affected.
>>>> >
>>>> > However, PDWG is not the place to address those problems.
>>>>
>>>> Could you elaborate on which forum, structure, or mechanism you
>>>> consider appropriate for addressing these issues, given that they directly
>>>> affect the continuity, functionality, and compliance of the PDP?
>>>>
>>>
>>> SO: The issue is governance matter, it affected PDWG directly just as it
>>> affected Govcom, Nomcom, AFRINIC Org, etc it even affected the CEO.
>>>
>>> I have stated before that I believe the bylaws is the place to address
>>> the issue at high level and there is an existing bylaws review ongoing to
>>> address those bylaws related changes that ensures that when the board
>>> losses quorum then there is a mechanism that ensures not just PDWG but
>>> every other aspect of the organisation continue to operate.
>>>
>>>
>>> As it stands, the bylaw has not resolved this issue and we are not sure
>>> we will have a resolution soon. Therefore it’s very prudent to think of a
>>> solution to protect this working group from such undesirable consequences.
>>>
>>> I support the idea of finding the solution within the PDP which in
>>> principle is suppose to function independently of other bodies of AFRINIC.
>>> This doesn’t stop the organisation to find a global solution with the
>>> bylaws.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> > This proposal is attempting to use the event that occurred to the
>>>> board to turn PDWG to a self governing independent authority through policy
>>>> and I do not believe that is the way to go about it.
>>>>
>>>> This proposal is not attempting to “turn the PDWG into a self‑governing
>>>> independent authority.” The PDWG already is a self‑governing,
>>>> community‑driven authority by design. What the proposal does is address the
>>>> structural weaknesses that recent events exposed; weaknesses that placed
>>>> AFRINIC in breach of ICP‑2 and threatened the continuity of the entire
>>>> regional registry.
>>>>
>>>
>>> SO: Once again I believe that Bylaw is the place to address those
>>> weakness as the event that occur didn't just affect PDWG alone. Roles and
>>> responsibilities of the Co-Chairs is a different thing which is within
>>> scope of PDWG.
>>>
>>>
>>>> As required by ICP‑2, all RIRs must maintain a bottom‑up,
>>>> self‑governance structure for developing local policies. This structure
>>>> must be community‑driven, transparent, and resilient. Each RIR therefore
>>>> defines a PDP that reflects its operational realities. AFRINIC is no
>>>> exception.
>>>>
>>>> Under AFRINIC’s governance model, the PDWG is already a self‑governing
>>>> body whose authority is delegated downward to AFRINIC Ltd’s Board through
>>>> the Bylaws — not the other way around. The Bylaws themselves make this
>>>> clear:
>>>> • Definition of the PDP (Section 23): The PDP is approved by the
>>>> Internet Community. This establishes the primacy of the community in policy
>>>> development.
>>>> • Section 15.3: The Board determines allocation guidelines in line
>>>> with the member‑driven PDP. The PDP constrains the Board.
>>>> • Section 11.2: The Board calls a PPM as per requirements defined
>>>> in the PDP. The PDP defines the conditions
>>>>
>>>> This model has been in place since AFRINIC’s inception. What has
>>>> changed is that its risk profile was never assessed, and the events
>>>> affecting the Board demonstrated how fragile the system becomes when
>>>> governance failures occur. The PDP stalled, the community could not advance
>>>> policy, and AFRINIC fell out of compliance with ICP‑2.
>>>>
>>>
>>> SO: Well the PDP didn't do that, the bylaw did. Respectfully, I do not
>>> agree that PDP is what should restrict the board in this context, it is
>>> rather members who restrict the board as defined in the bylaws. I also do
>>> not agree that having a PDWG that is self sustaining while the Board is not
>>> quorate will fulfill ICP-2 either because that directly signals governance
>>> failure according to ICP 2
>>>
>>>
>>> Can you please explain why having a self-sustaining PDWG while the Board
>>> is dysfunctional is itself a signal of failure?
>>> My understanding is that the governance failure is evidenced by a Board
>>> that cannot reach quorum; continuing policy development through the PDWG
>>> seems like a mitigation measure to maintain continuity, not an additional
>>> problem.
>>>
>>
>> It signals a failure becasue section 4.1 d and f of the NRO governance
>> document will be grossly unfulfilled. The point here is that the role of
>> the Board and that of PDWG is interdependent. The PDP makes the policy, the
>> board gives it legal ratification. If the PDWG is to be repurposed to
>> perform a dual role either temporarily or permanently then it needs to
>> become a "governing body" as defined in section 1.1 of the NRO governing
>> document. Is that really what we want?
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> The new NRO Governance Document for the Recognition, Operation, and
>>>> Derecognition of RIRs, currently under discussion, introduces stricter
>>>> continuity obligations. These obligations will require AFRINIC to
>>>> demonstrate that its PDP and the structures supporting it can continue to
>>>> function even when AFRINIC Ltd faces governance paralysis.
>>>>
>>>
>>> And where is the best place to ensure that if not in the bylaws?
>>>
>>>
>>> Do we have this covered by the bylaws as of date?
>>>
>>
>> I will note that I do not see where the NRO governance document expects
>> that PDP performs the function of the board when the Board is
>> dysfunctional. However the document expect that the Board(the RIR) in
>> performing it's governing role put in place mechanism that ensures it's
>> various structures are functional with redundant procedures in place. ref
>> Section 4.1L
>>
>> The bylaw is the document to bake in those redundant procedures. As they
>> are not in the bylaw right now, then we should put them not just to serve
>> PDWG but to serve the various structures of the organisation which PDWG is
>> one of them
>>
>> For example I expect that a dysfunctional board would trigger a section
>> of the bylaw that initiates a process where members put in place temporary
>> measures that will continue to give operational continuity to various
>> structures of AFRINIC including PDWG. I do not believe that the PDWG should
>> be that temporary measure.
>>
>>>
>>> I do not agree that "fixing" PDP alone would fulfill requirements of the
>>> new NRO Governance document if other structures including the Board is
>>> broken. article 4.1 of the Governance document clearly states the
>>> expectation of each structure and places significant expectations on the
>>> governing body. 4.1g clearly states the expectations for PDP and
>>> continuation without the board is not one of them. Section 4.1h further
>>> states policy compliance expectations and who will ensure that if not the
>>> governing body as represented by the Board.
>>>
>>>
>>>> For this reason, the community must review the PDP, identify the
>>>> necessary amendments, and agree on the evolution required to ensure
>>>> continuity. Where appropriate, these changes will trigger corresponding
>>>> updates to the AFRINIC Ltd Bylaws and internal operational procedures.
>>>>
>>>> This proposal is one such attempt. A community‑driven effort to
>>>> strengthen the PDP, ensure compliance with ICP‑2, and prevent a repeat of
>>>> the governance failures that affected AFRINIC and the region.
>>>>
>>>
>>> SO: I appreciate the intent but I do not agree that PDP is the mechanism
>>> to effect this. I have no problem with the review of roles and
>>> responsibilities of Co-Chairs. The PDWG is a consensus gathering mechanism
>>> it should not become a legal ratification vehicle at the same time. That
>>> role should remain with the board and we have to agree that if the board
>>> have problem then the entire organisation has problem. Infact the board
>>> will not be fulfilling 4.1f of the governing document.
>>>
>>> In summary If the PDWG could somehow bypass the Board entirely to
>>> implement policy(as suggested by the proposal), or if the lack of a
>>> functioning Board stalls the process indefinitely, it triggers multiple
>>> compliance failures under ICP-2. So why not avoid lack of a functioning
>>> board so that PDWG and other structures within AFRINIC can continue to
>>> function. Then we test 4.1g against our current PDP and addresses any
>>> lapses found which to me are not much
>>>
>>>
>>>> Hope this helps
>>>>
>>>
>>> Thanks 🙏
>>>
>>>>
>>>> —Alain
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> >
>>>> > Nevertheless, there is merit in clarifying roles of Co-Chairs and
>>>> some of the 3.3.2 texts addresses that, hence that then can become the
>>>> problem statement and sections that does not relate to roles and
>>>> responsibilities can be commented out.
>>>>
>>>> >
>>>> > Regards
>>>> >
>>>> > ----
>>>> > Sent from my mobile
>>>> > kindly excuse typos
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> > On Fri, 19 Jun 2026, 6:22 pm Gregoire EHOUMI, <
>>>> gregoire.ehoumi at yahoo.fr> wrote:
>>>> > Hello Seun,
>>>> >
>>>> > Please see the references below. Most importantly, what do you think
>>>> should not be listed under the co-chairs' roles and responsibilities in the
>>>> proposal?
>>>> > https://www.apnic.net/community/participate/sigs/sig-guidelines/
>>>> > Chair and co-chairs roles - section 2.3
>>>> > https://www.lacnic.net/679/2/lacnic/policy-development-process
>>>> > PDP chairs section 3.2
>>>> > https://www.ripe.net/publications/docs/ripe-861/
>>>> >
>>>> > RIPE Working Group Chair Job Description and Procedures — RIPE
>>>> Network Coordination Centre
>>>> >
>>>> > Best regards,
>>>> >
>>>> > Gregoire
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> >> On Jun 9, 2026, at 9:09 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji at gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>> >>
>>>> >> Hello Gregoire,
>>>> >>
>>>> >> Please find the details inline:
>>>> >>
>>>> >> On Tue, 9 Jun 2026 at 14:27, Gregoire EHOUMI <
>>>> gregoire.ehoumi at yahoo.fr> wrote:
>>>> >> Dear PDWG,
>>>> >>
>>>> >> This digest summarises the key points raised by community members
>>>> (Ben, Seun, and Sami) regarding this policy proposal, along with the
>>>> authors’ clarifications and responses.
>>>> >> It is organised into four themes for easier reading.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> 1. Corrections & Clarifications
>>>> >> Mailing list freeze clarification:
>>>> >> •
>>>> >> Comment (Ben): The RPD list was not frozen; only community‑discuss
>>>> was moderated.
>>>> >> • Response: Acknowledged. The text will be corrected in Draft 2.
>>>> It was meant to say “ Inactive Resource Policy Discussion mailing list”
>>>> >>
>>>> >>
>>>> >> 2. Participation, Representation & Elections
>>>> >> Nomination support requirements:
>>>> >> •
>>>> >> Comment (Seun): No need for supporters to be both AFRINIC members
>>>> and community members.
>>>> >> • Response: The intent is to ensure support from at least one
>>>> contact of the membership. Participants in the PDP and the WG activities
>>>> are generally classified in 2 categories: “Registered contact of AFRINIC
>>>> member” and “ Non-registered contact of AFRINIC member”
>>>> >>
>>>> >> SO: Current participants of RPD do not need to be a “Registered
>>>> contact of AFRINIC member” OR “ Non-registered contact of AFRINIC member”,
>>>> the PDWG is and should be open to any person interested in number policy
>>>> development including non AFRINIC members. Note that there is a subtle
>>>> difference between non-registered contact of AFRINIC member and a
>>>> non-AFRINIC member. It should be okay to require support from either an
>>>> AFRINIC member OR a community member, but the current text mandates both.To
>>>> illustrate a nomination supported by 2 community members should pass just
>>>> as a nomination supported by 2 afrinic member, likewise 1 afrinic member
>>>> and 1 community member.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> Who can vote in NRO NC elections:
>>>> >> •
>>>> >> Comment (Seun): No reason to restrict voting to people in the region.
>>>> >> • Response: This follows existing AFRINIC rules. For NRO NC,
>>>> only participants from the region(excluding staff) vote.
>>>> >>
>>>> >>
>>>> >> SO: My rationale is based on the premise that the rpd is open to
>>>> all; hence, PDWG co-chair voters should not be restricted to in-region. By
>>>> extension, NRO NC voters should be similar. Nevertheless considering past
>>>> experiences, I agree there is merit in restricting voting to in-region but
>>>> that discriminates on participation as voting is a form of participation as
>>>> well.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> 3. Co‑Chair Roles, Eligibility & Processes
>>>> >> Level of detail in co‑chair responsibilities:
>>>> >> •
>>>> >> Comment (Seun): Responsibilities in section 3.3.2 feel too granular
>>>> and policing.
>>>> >> • Response: The detail is intentional, based on RFC 2418 and
>>>> other RIRs practices, to avoid ambiguity. The WG should be predictable.
>>>>
>>>> >>
>>>> >>
>>>> >> SO: I do not know of an RIR process that is as granular in the
>>>> responsibility of co-chairs as stated in 3.3.2. Section 6.1 of RFC 2418
>>>> that describes the role of a working group chair isn't as granular either.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> Eligibility criteria — meeting attendance:
>>>> >> •
>>>> >> Comment (Seun): Requiring attendance at 4 of the last 6 PPMs
>>>> (including one in‑person) may be unrealistic.
>>>> >> • Response: at the old rhythm of 2 PPMs a year, this requirement
>>>> means attending 4 of the 6 meetings held the last 3 years with at least
>>>> one in-person. With Attendance A=4 and Meetings M= 6, what would you
>>>> suggest for A and M?
>>>> >>
>>>> >> SO: Requiring in-person attendance is my main concern, it should not
>>>> be mandatory. You may find at times that it is cheaper to travel out of
>>>> Africa than within Africa, so not everyone can afford an in-person meeting.
>>>> Let individual voters decide on candidates based on their historical
>>>> participation.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> Appointment by consensus:
>>>> >> •
>>>> >> Comment (Seun): Consensus‑based appointment could introduce
>>>> subjectivity.
>>>> >> • Response: This WG makes decisions by consensus with appeal
>>>> mechanisms in place. Appointing co-chairs via the same mechanisms should
>>>> not be a problem. With the requirements stated at section 3.3.3, it should
>>>> not be difficult to reach consensus on co-chairs candidates. While this may
>>>> not be perfect, it is used worldwide by various WGs. “Community” votes
>>>> rather bring more subjectivity.
>>>> >>
>>>> >>
>>>> >> Code of Conduct reference:
>>>> >> •
>>>> >> Comment (Seun): Simply refer to AFRINIC’s CoC.
>>>> >> • Response: By referring to “applicable CoC” the proposal avoids
>>>> attaching to a particular CoC. Today we are using the “AFRINIC Community
>>>> CoC” elaborated by the board ( https://afrinic.net/code ), this may
>>>> change in the future. We saw some recent CoC discussions on the list.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> SO: Who determines which Code of Conduct (CoC) is "applicable" and
>>>> which is not?
>>>> >>
>>>> >> 4. Governance Structure & Proposal Scope
>>>> >> Necessity of the Number Council:
>>>> >> •
>>>> >> Comment (Seun): The Appeal Committee could perform the same role;
>>>> RNC may be unnecessary.
>>>> >> • Response: The RNC’s roles encompass calling PPM and appointing
>>>> interim co-chairs. So making the AC perform RNC’s role may not be
>>>> appropriate.
>>>> >>
>>>> >>
>>>> >> What I am trying to communicate is that the RNC and its proposed
>>>> roles are not required. There is value in having nomcom whose membership
>>>> is more likely to change every year perform the role of getting nominations
>>>> for PDWG Co-Chair. If both Co-Chairs resign, the Board should select one of
>>>> the 3 NRO NC members to chair temporarily until a co-Chair is elected.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> Splitting the proposal into smaller documents:
>>>> >> •
>>>> >> Comment (Sami): Consider withdrawing and splitting into multiple
>>>> focused proposals.
>>>> >> • Response: The components are interdependent; splitting them
>>>> would create incoherent intermediate states and procedural gaps.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> SO: I looked at the problem enumerated below:
>>>> >>
>>>> >> • Adopted policy proposals not ratified or not implemented
>>>> >> • No Public Policy Meeting - Non-renewal of co-chairs
>>>> >> • Non-renewal of appeal and recall committees
>>>> >> • Non-renewal of ASO AC/NRO NC representatives
>>>> >> • Frozen Resource Policy Discussion mailing list
>>>> >> The problems stated in the policy as listed above (apart from the
>>>> last which has been corrected) all stemmed from the Board not having a
>>>> quorum. The idea that the volunteer PDWG should or can effectively operate
>>>> when there is no Board in the future is wishful thinking that should not be
>>>> encouraged. In fact, the PDP operation is mandated by the bylaws, and the
>>>> Board has the fiduciary responsibility to oversee the entire organisation.
>>>> It therefore seems to me that this policy attempts to address a governance
>>>> issue through policy rather than through the bylaws. Bylaws is the way to
>>>> ensure that the events that happened with the Board in the past does not
>>>> repeat itself.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> Board ratification language:
>>>> >> •
>>>> >> Comment (Seun): “Shall” implies the Board must ratify; the Board
>>>> should be able to decline with reasons.
>>>> >> • Response: The text as written “If a policy proposal approved
>>>> by the PDWG fails to be ratified by the board (inability or refusal by the
>>>> board without reasons for 60 days), a petition for ratification can be
>>>> initiated by a member of the PDWG.” it is meant to cover the two scenarios
>>>> below:
>>>> >>
>>>> >> 1. The Board is unable to act for 60 days (No quorum, No functioning
>>>> Board, Legal or operational paralysis, etc.)
>>>> >> 2. The Board refuses to ratify without giving reasons for 60 days
>>>> (the Board says “no” but gives no justification, or The Board simply does
>>>> nothing and provides no explanation.)
>>>> >> Any suggestions to improve the text if it is not clear enough ?
>>>> >>
>>>> >> SO: I think there may be a need to review the problem statement
>>>> first so the rest of the document is better guided
>>>> >>
>>>> >> Regards
>>>> >>
>>>> >>
>>>> >> The authors thank the community for constructive feedback.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> Regards,
>>>> >>
>>>> >> Grégoire
>>>> >>
>>>> >>
>>>> >>
>>>> >>> On May 27, 2026, at 2:45 PM, Sami Salih <sami.salih at outlook.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> Dear Colleagues,
>>>> >>> As a former PDWG Co-chair, I generally support the intent behind
>>>> strengthening the autonomy and operational continuity of the PDWG. The
>>>> policy development process ultimately belongs to the African Internet
>>>> community and should remain resilient regardless of operational or
>>>> governance challenges affecting AFRINIC as an organisation.
>>>> >>> At the same time, I believe it is important to recognize that this
>>>> proposal introduces substantial structural, operational, procedural, and
>>>> governance changes to the PDP framework. In many respects, this is a major
>>>> and transformative proposal rather than a routine procedural update.
>>>> >>> From my experience with the PDP, the community process tends to
>>>> work best when addressing clearly scoped issues through focused and
>>>> easy-to-understand proposals. In contrast, this proposal attempts to
>>>> address many different governance, electoral, operational, disciplinary,
>>>> and procedural matters simultaneously, which makes it difficult for the
>>>> community to fully analyse, discuss, and build meaningful consensus around
>>>> all aspects at once.
>>>> >>> IMHO, many of the ideas and intended improvements presented in this
>>>> proposal are constructive and deserve serious consideration. I also fully
>>>> acknowledge and respect the extensive experience, effort, and strategic
>>>> thinking of the authors in developing such a comprehensive framework
>>>> proposal.
>>>> >>> However, considering the breadth of the changes and the number of
>>>> distinct governance and operational matters being introduced
>>>> simultaneously, my respectful recommendation would be to consider
>>>> withdrawing the current proposal and restructuring this work into multiple
>>>> smaller and more focused proposals. I believe this would make it
>>>> significantly easier for the community to understand, analyse, discuss, and
>>>> build meaningful consensus around each individual topic independently,
>>>> while improving overall community engagement and participation in the
>>>> process.
>>>> >>> With Regards,
>>>> >>> Sami Sali.
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> Sami Salih
>>>> >>> From: Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji at gmail.com>
>>>> >>> Sent: Monday, May 25, 2026 8:43:56 PM
>>>> >>> To: dacostadarwin at gmail.com <dacostadarwin at gmail.com>
>>>> >>> Cc: rpd at afrinic.net <rpd at afrinic.net>
>>>> >>> Subject: Re: [rpd] New Draft Policy Proposal - Amendment of the PDP
>>>> Working Group (WG) Guidelines and Procedures AFPUB-2026-GEN-001-DRAFT01.
>>>> Hello,
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> Thanks for sharing this proposal. My initial comments after a brief
>>>> review are the following:
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> - A typical community member could also be an AFRINIC member. There
>>>> is no reason to mandate that nomination supporters for the NRO NC must be
>>>> both community members and AFRINIC members. Requiring one or 2 supporters
>>>> from the service region should be sufficient.
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> - The rpd is open to anyone that wishes to participate irrespective
>>>> of origin, region or residence. It sure makes sense to restrict election
>>>> participation to those with a historical record of involvement, either
>>>> online or in-person to avoid historical experience of DDOS on election
>>>> day. However, there is no reason to restrict the selectorate/electorate to
>>>> those in the region alone.
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> - I do not see the necessity of a Number Committee; it seems to
>>>> create yet another layer. The Appeal committee which also serves as the
>>>> recall committee can perform any intended role of the RNC. Its composition
>>>> could be the 3 NRO NC members from the region, a past co-chair, and a past
>>>> appeal committee chair in a non-voting capacity. In situations where both
>>>> Co-Chairs are no more, the Chair of the Appeal committee can temporarily
>>>> take over until rpd appoints a new co-chair
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> - As a former co-chair of PDWG, i find the proposed
>>>> responsibilities of the Co-chairs as described in section 3.3.2 to be
>>>> overly granular and quite policing-like for lack of a better word.
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> - I believe the proposed 3.3.7 should refer to AFRINIC CoC and that
>>>> should be sufficient. The proposed penalties for violations look good,
>>>> though they are a bit too wordy to me and the process leading to that is
>>>> quite descriptive. We really need to give the co-chairs the privilege of
>>>> managing events as they deem applicable
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> - The idea that a co-chair eligibility should be tied to attending
>>>> in-person meetings during a specific period isn't realistic given our
>>>> region's unique challenges. I understand it may be an effort to put a face
>>>> to the name but restricting eligibility to the last 2 years (which is
>>>> basically last 4 PPM) isn't realistic.
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> - 3.3.3.3.3 suggests co-chairs will be appointed by consensus, that
>>>> is an interesting point that i would definitely not support. This can lead
>>>> to unnecessary subjectivity.
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> - I like the expectation of participation from Co-Chair hence 3.3.4
>>>> appeals to me as written.
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> - Use of shall in 3.3.11 suggests that ratification is the only
>>>> option for the Board. There should be an option for the Board to provide
>>>> reasons for not ratifying and that should not be triggered by a petition.
>>>>
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> I may have more comments in future, but that is all from me for now.
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> Regards
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> On Mon, 25 May 2026 at 10:20, dacostadarwin at gmail.com <
>>>> dacostadarwin at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> >>> Dear PDWG,
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> We have received a new draft policy proposal - Amendment of the PDP
>>>> Working Group (WG) Guidelines and Procedures AFPUB-2026-GEN-001-DRAFT01
>>>> from authors Grégoire EHOUMI, Noah Maina and Adeola A. P. AINA.
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> The proposal contents are published at:
>>>> https://afrinic.net/policy/proposals/afpub-2026-gen-001-draft01
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> We encourage you to take some time to go through the proposal
>>>> contents and provide feedback as follows :
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> a) Do you support or oppose the proposal?
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> b) If you oppose the proposal, state your reasons.
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> c) Is there anything in the proposal that is not clear?
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> d) What changes could be made to this proposal to make it more
>>>> effective?
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> Regards,
>>>> >>> Vincent Ngundi & Darwin Da Costa
>>>> >>> AFRINIC PDWG Co-Chairs
>>>> >>> _______________________________________________
>>>> >>> RPD mailing list
>>>> >>> RPD at afrinic.net
>>>> >>> https://lists.afrinic.net/mailman/listinfo/rpd
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> --
>>>> >>>
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> >>> Seun Ojedeji,
>>>> >>> Bringing another down does not take you up - think about your
>>>> action!
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> _______________________________________________
>>>> >>> RPD mailing list
>>>> >>> RPD at afrinic.net
>>>> >>> https://lists.afrinic.net/mailman/listinfo/rpd
>>>> >>
>>>> >>
>>>> >>
>>>> >> --
>>>> >>
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> >> Seun Ojedeji,
>>>> >> Bringing another down does not take you up - think about your action!
>>>> >>
>>>> >
>>>> > _______________________________________________
>>>> > RPD mailing list
>>>> > RPD at afrinic.net
>>>> > https://lists.afrinic.net/mailman/listinfo/rpd
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> RPD mailing list
>>>> RPD at afrinic.net
>>>> https://lists.afrinic.net/mailman/listinfo/rpd
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> RPD mailing list
>>> RPD at afrinic.net
>>> https://lists.afrinic.net/mailman/listinfo/rpd
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>> RPD mailing list
>> RPD at afrinic.net
>> https://lists.afrinic.net/mailman/listinfo/rpd
>>
>
--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Seun Ojedeji,*
Bringing another down does not take you up - think about your action!
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