[rpd] IPv4 Inter-RIR Resource Transfers (Comprehensive Scope) - AFPUB-2019-IPv4-002-DRAFT07

[Owen DeLong]

> 
> [Jordi] This is already prevented by:
> “5.7.2.3 An entity that has received IPv4 resources from AFRINIC within the preceding 16 months will not be approved as a transfer source.”
>  
> Also, if you obtain resources from AFRINIC with the only goal to transfer them to make profit and consequently your justification for the need is artificial, the transfer pre-check at 5.7.5 will discover that and you will not be only not able to transfer but also the resources may become recovered.

Since I’m opposed to the policy so long as 5.7.5 persists, I hardly think that using it as an explanation or to address my concern here is going to work.

>> Chairs shall notice that even if the impact analysis is extremely useful to authors and community, the staff can have a totally different view from the community, so the impact analysis is good as a point for discussion but never can be considered “per se” as objections unless duly justitified
>  
> Here, I mostly agree, but with greater constraints. The impact analysis should be limited in scope to those impacts which the staff sees as a predictable impact to the RIR from the proposed policy. It shouldn’t go into speculation or ideology. It should stick to the facts and be a neutral report of the reasonably predictable results of implementing the policy and document how staff would interpret the policy as written and how it would be implemented.
>  
> It should not be considered an objection unless there is a legal or fiduciary concern expressed and any such concern should be clearly called out as such and its basis should be well documented.
>  
> [Jordi] I mostly agree here with you. However, if there is a persistent problem in all the impact analysis, as it is happening, because a “legal” friction between the community right (which are always on top of any RIR) and the RIR/membership itself, then it shows a clear problem with the bylaws and/or RSA that must be corrected. The only RIR which the bylaws are generating such kind of interferences is AFRINIC: that should tell us something! In fact, if we strictly follow the bylaws, many of the most active participants in the PDP will not be able to participate, because the definition of (17) “Internet community” in the bylaws restrict that to “any person or corporate body living or operating in the AFRINIC service region” and then the PDP definition (23) calls for that “Internet community” definition. Also 11.3 talks about “Regional”. There many other problems, those are just examples. Somebody was not really doing a good job at all when the bylaws where written and even worst, they should have not passed the ICP-2 approval!

The legal fiction is the idea that the community is on top of the RIR. This might somehow be true in the case of RIPE. It’s not at all true in any of the four other RIRs based on the way they are chartered and structured under the laws of the various jurisdictions where they are incorporated.

The bylaws create thee same kind of interference in ARIN, the difference is that there is less controversy because:
	1)	The ARIN bylaws are better written and more internally consistent.
	2)	The ARIN bylaws are not misinterpreted in a situationally dependent way. They are applied consistently and in a
		predictable manner that is in line with the actual text.
	3)	The ARIN community while diverse is significantly less fractious than the AFRINIC community.
	4)	The ARIN board and ARIN AC tend to be significantly more transparent and communicative about their
		actions and the reasoning behind them.
	5)	As a result, the community knows not only what the ARIN board and ARIN AC have done, but they also know
		why.
	6) 	As a result, the ARIN community tends to accept the limitations on the policy process and the AC tends to
		reject out-of-scope policies early in the process such that there isn’t so much of an issue with policies coming
		to consensus that cannot be implemented.

>> 2.       Regarding the AFRINIC role, while this is not considered in any other RIR, because in my opinion is something very obvious (the role of the RIR is just helping, and the final responsibility is on the source and recipient of the transfers), I understand that having some text that clarify that is not harming, so I’ve added section 5.7.6 (Due digilence) in the new version of the proposal to address it.
>  
> 5.7.6 is utterly unnecessary. It has nothing to do with number resource policy and should be stricken.
>  
> AFRINIC is a registry. They keep track of who is the registrant of a set of number resources within a cooperating set of entities (the RIR system and those ISPs who choose to implement their networks in accordance with the RIR system). They are there to guarantee uniqueness among those cooperating entities, manage the registrations within that database according to policies set by the community, and provide a forum for the community to develop said policies.
>  
> They are not a governing body. They are not a regulator. They are not kings of the internet, gods, or even a court of arbitration. They are just an NGO with a mission. That mission is to provide unique registrations of internet number resources according to community developed policies and facilitate the use of those registrations among cooperating entities who choose to work within the system.
>  
> Recent attempts to weaponize AFRINIC are proof that some, including many among AFRINIC leadership have either lost sight of this or have an alternate agenda seeking to enrich themselves. I honestly don’t know which is the case at this point, but it is clear that there are problems which need to be addressed.
>  
> [Jordi] 5.7.6 has been added under request form the IA. As said I agree it is not needed, because it is obvious, however it doesn’t harm if it avoids objections based on the IA text on this.

It is harmful in that it creates unnecessary confusion for participants in a transfer as to what kind and level of due diligence is required or expected of them.

It goes beyond disclaiming AFRINIC’s liability and creates an unclear set of requirements with no useful explanation.

It should be removed. Even if such a clarification is needed somewhere, it belongs in a contract, not in the CPM.
 
>> 3.       Regarding the RSA signature, again, while I believe this is obvious and once more is not explicit in other RIRs, I’ve added text to clarify it. Note that there is no such 3.6 in the proposal, so I believe there is some mismatch in your text, may be chairs also reading the wrong IA? So, in summary, section 5.7.3.3 of the proposal, already was clear, but now has been eddited to be even more exlicit on this in 5.7.3.1.
>  
> I think you mean edited and explicit.
>  
> [Jordi] Yes, I’ve resend this text in a subsequent email (and added a point that I missed) because I was using a previous email from a previous proposal … I believe I corrected those typos as well in my subsequent email.
>  
> 
>> 4.       Section 5.7.5 has been updated to be more clear and now explicitly allows that other violations of the RSA/CPM aren’t “protected” by the pre-check.
>  
> Section 5.7.5 is getting worse instead of better. This entire pre-check provision is an opportunity to weaponize AFRINIC to hold resources captive in the case that some staff member or leadership person dislikes a transfer source for whatever reason. It provides broad latitude to inflict arbitrary judgment.
>  
> Given recent weaponization of AFRINIC processes against certain members, I must strenuously object to any policy proposal that contains this provision.
>  
> [Jordi] As said, even if we don’t have this text explicit, AFRINIC can and shall do exactly the same. This text actually protects the resource holders from being reclaimed for the resources in case of a failed transfer, because the lack of need will come on the back of the resource holder in that case: “I don’t need any more the resources, but I’m transferring them – oh because the transfer failed – the recipient is not fulfilling the requirements – now I can “artificially” justify again the need otherwise I need to return the resources of face a reclamation”.

The language as currently written does not prevent AFRINIC from subsequently attempting to reclaim the resources after a failed transfer.

So it does not offer protection, it merely creates a convenient place for staff to point as they weaponize their discretion against members they don’t like.

It should be removed or it should be replaced with a clause that reads something like this:

5.7.5 AFRINIC may deny a registrant as the source of a transfer only if one or more of the following applies:
	1.	Clear evidence that the resources were fraudulently obtained.
	2.	Registrant is not current on their AFRINIC fees.
	3.	There is some question or dispute as to whether registrant is the resource holder of record.
	4.	There is an unresolved third-party claim to the registration.

If one of the above does not apply, then AFRINIC must approve the registrant as source of the transfer and proceed unless there is a problem with the recipient.

That would actually protect resource holders.

Owen

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