[rpd] Policy Impact

[Gregoire EHOUMI]

+1

— Gregoire



> Le 3 juin 2020 à 12:14, Nishal Goburdhan <nishal at controlfreak.co.za> a écrit :

> 

> On 3 Jun 2020, at 17:12, Owen DeLong wrote:

> 

> 

> 

>> In order for ROAs to have helped, the upstream providers would need to have done ROV. Of course, given that Seacom left stale route objects in the IRR, it’s just as likely they would have left stale ROAs sitting in the database which would have rendered any ability for RPKI to address this event useless.

> 

> (at least at afrinic) the IP address space holder is responsible for ROA creation.  *not* the originating asn (assuming they are different).

> 

> i know you probably already know this, owen  :-)   but judging from the comments on the AS0 policy, there’s enough confusion as to what RPKI is and how it works, that it’s worth pointing this out.

> 

> --n.

> 

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