[DBWG] RIPE proposed changes to the routing registry

[Job Snijders]

Dear Madhvi,

On Fri, Jun 08, 2018 at 04:24:48PM +0400, Madhvi Gokool wrote:
> Thanks Job for this insight.

If AfriNIC sees any merit in the approach to forgo this extended type
of validation (and rely solely on the authority of the AfriNIC member -
the owner of the prefix).

What would be the next step to deprecate this extended validation
requirement?

Kind regards,

Job

> On 08/06/2018 4:16 PM, Job Snijders wrote:
> > Dear Madhvi,
> >
> > On Fri, Jun 08, 2018 at 04:07:17PM +0400, Madhvi Gokool wrote:
> >>> On 08/06/2018 3:35 PM, Job Snijders wrote:
> >>> It would be my understanding that the AFRINIC IRR still is only
> >>> available to AfriNIC members if foreign ASNs are allowed in "route:"
> >>> objects (just like with RPKI ROAs). After all, in my example it is not
> >>> NTT who can create or remove the route-object, but only the AfriNIC
> >>> member can create/remove/modify the route-object.
> >> You have a valid point.
> >>
> >> But, how can we ascertain (or rather do we want to ascertain) that
> >> there is consent from the ASN holder that the ASN can be used in the
> >> route(6) object?
> > No consent is required from the ASN holder.
> >
> > As an example: The RIPE NCC IRR is moving to a model where only the
> > prefix-owner needs to authorize route-object creation. This change was
> > introduced because it was recognised that it brought significant delays
> > to the provisioning process, and added no value, and in the case of
> > RIPE's model it introduced pollution of the database. 
> >
> > In other IRRs such as ARIN, NTTCOM, RADB this never was a requirement.
> > Also, with RPKI ROAs, no such consent is required from the ASN holder.
> >
> > Kind regards,
> >
> > Job
> 
> -- 
> Madhvi Gokool
> Registration Services Manager, AFRINIC Ltd.
> t:  +230 403 5100 | f: +230 466 6758 | 
> w: www.afrinic.net
>