[Community-Discuss] Cloud Innovation Displays Very Poor, If Not Criminal, Netizenship

Dr P Nyirenda paulos at sdnp.org.mw
Wed May 27 09:07:49 UTC 2020


On 27 May 2020 at 0:46, Owen DeLong wrote:

>     On May 26, 2020, at 08:27 , James <james.chirwa at afrinic.net> wrote:
> 
>     Dear Gregoire,
> 
>     Let me first of all thank you for sharing your concern as well as  seeking clarification regarding 
>     the matter under hand.
>     You have sought  from AFRINIC an explanation as regard the term " delegation of IP block".
>     As far as AFRINIC is concerned , it does not practice " delegation of IP Block". Its handling 
>     of IP Blocks involves only allocation, sub-allocation or assignment .
>
> In this context, delegation is used as a superset of the terms allocation, sub-allocation, and 
> assignment.

Mmmm ... I am with James Chirwa on this one. I think allowing "superset of the terms" in 
ploicy documents will lead to major confusion where the need to be precise is paramount.

> From the dictionary:

Policy documents contain a section on definitions that are precisely put there to avoid 
common dictionary definitions like these, specifically to avoid confusion.

> ... cut ... <
 
> When number resources are allocated, sub-allocated, or assigned, the RIR, NIR, or LIR is, in fact, 
> committing the administrative functions
> over said addresses to the recipient.
> 
> This is well understood throughout the IP using community and I am surprised by James 
> statement, especially in light of the following:
> 
> https://www.afrinic.net/services/123-afrinic-policy-for-reverse-delegation-on-allocated-ip-addresse
> s

This applies to DNS and not to IP address allocations and/or assignments.

I would like to refer you to extensive work done by the CCNSO Framework of Interpretation    
Working Group (FOIWG) which did a lot of work in this area of DNS and produced its report 
in 2014, see: https://ccnso.icann.org/sites/default/files/filefield_46435/foi-final-07oct14-en.pdf

We did this work in that working group to avoid this kind of confusion that you appear to have 
here when using such words as "delegation" in identifiers.

> And of course, CPM 2.6: (https://afrinic.net/policy/manual )
> 
> 2.6 Assignment
> An assignment is an IP address block given by an LIR to its end-users for their own usage. To 
> "assign" means to delegate address space to an ISP or End User for specific use within the 
> Internet infrastructure they operate. Assignments must only be made for specific purposes 
> documented by specific organisations and are not to be sub-assigned to other parties.

The policy document here refers to the action "by an LIR" and not that of an RIR, lets not 
confuse the two.

Regards,

Paulos
======================
Dr Paulos B Nyirenda
NIC.MW & .mw ccTLD
http://www.registrar.mw
Tel:  +265-(0)-882 089 166
Cell: +265-(0)-888-824787
WhatsApp: +265-(0)-887386433

 
> Owen
> 
>     You may contact  the operator/member who has utilised  the said term for more clarification.
>     Regards,
>     James
>     On 23/05/2020 18:21, Gregoire EHOUMI via Community-Discuss wrote:
>     Hello,
>     
>     Thanks Mark for exposing the details of the SEACOM AS37353 hijacking.
>     
>     I carefully read your report and also the Cloud Innovation Limited quick response 
>     including their attachments as justifications.
>     
>     I note that;
>     
>      the service contract with Cloud Innovation covering the announcement of their 
>     prefixes by SEACOM AS37353 was terminated  by SEACOM.
>     
>      some stale IRR route objects existed after termination of the contract.
>     
>      through some multiple layer distribution an organisation in Manila Philippines was 
>     "delegated" an IP block from Cloud Innovation address space.
>     
>      both upstream ISP and the customer in Manila set up a BGP session using 
>     SEACOM's AS37353 as the ASN of the Manila customer.
>     
>      there was a prompt reaction from the involved parties that included apologies to 
>     SEACOM and the wider internet community.
>     
>      there were promises from said parties to be a better netizen which would mean, 
>     them not hijacking other networks ASN's.
>     
>      there was clear refusal to disclose the details of the customer in Manila Philippines 
>     who hijacked the affected SEACOM ASN.
>     
>     All put together, demonstrates that what happened was an impersonation and not a 
>     BGP configuration error, nor an oversight in checking the right to use of the SEACOM 
>     ASN.
>     
>     1. Why is it that the real customer did not bother presenting its apologies to the 
>     community
>     
>     2. Why is there refusal to reveal customer´s details?
>     
>     3. Why is it that the said prefix is no longer seen in the routing table originated by the 
>     genius ASN or any other ASN?
>     
>     4. Which networks were involved and what happened to the end users?
>     
>     Can someone from AFRINIC explain what "delegation of IP block" mean?
>     
>     Note: The self organised Internet knows how to deal with bad net citizens.!
>     
>     Best regards 
>     Gregoire Ehoumi 
> 
> 
>     -------- Original message --------
>     From: Lu Heng <h.lu at anytimechinese.com>
>     Date: 2020-05-09 5:41 a.m. (GMT-05:00)
>     To: General Discussions of AFRINIC <community-discuss at afrinic.net>
>     Subject: Re: [Community-Discuss] Cloud Innovation Displays Very Poor, If Not 
>     Criminal, Netizenship
> 
>     To whom it may concern, 
> 
>     On May 8, Mark Think posted a claim to multiple lists that Cloud Innovation was 
>     abusing an ASN (37353) that didn´t belong to them (Cloud Innovation) but rather 
>     belonged to Seacom through their acquisition of MacroLAN.
> 
>     While we regret this unfortunate incident, Mark´s claims that it was criminal or bad 
>     netizenship on the part of Cloud Innovation is without foundation and utterly incorrect.
> 
>     As shown below in the attached document from Paul Wollner(Ex-CTO of 
>     Macrolan who created IRR routes to allow Macrolan to announce Cloud 
>     Innovation's prefix); letter from Link Infinity International Ltd. (Link Infinity), A 
>     customer of Cloud Innovation; and attached LOA from LARUS authorizing 
>     IPDC Solutions to announce the prefix with origin AS134190.  And a Letter 
>     from IPDC. This was an innocent mistake committed by third parties and had 
>     nothing to do with any action by Cloud Innovation or LARUS.
> 
>     Here´s what happened:
> 
>     Cloud Innovation delegated a /24 to Link Infinity, an ISP in December 
>     2019.
> 
>     Link Infinity further delegated that same /24 to IPDC and asked Cloud innovation 
>     to issue an LOA, which we did. The LOA specifically required IPDC to use its 
>     own ASN to announce the space (AS134190).
> 
>     IPDC subsequently authorized one of its customers to use the said 
>     prefix.
> 
>     For reasons still unknown to Cloud Innovation, IPDC and their customer 
>     set up a BGP session wherein their customer used AS37353 as the 
>     origin to advertise prefix 156.241.3.0/24.
> 
>     Upon discovering the announcement, rather than contact Cloud 
>     Innovation, Mark contacted IPDC who provided him with an incomplete 
>     explanation blaming their customer and Mark, not realizing that Cloud 
>     Innovation was not the customer in question posted far and wide about 
>     the event. It is unclear to us why he chose to do this rather than contact 
>     us to try and resolve the issue.
> 
>     A contributing factor to the erroneous BGP configuration by IPDC's customer 
>     may have been data contained in some outdated IRR route objects 
>     for 156.241.0.0/16 which have subsequently been deleted.
> 
>     As soon as we became aware of the problem (via Mark´s email), we began to 
>     investigate the situation. As soon as it was clear that this was the result of 
>     third-party actions, we reached out to Mark privately to let him know what we 
>     knew and that we were still investigating. We delayed making a public 
>     statement in order to try and ascertain all of the facts of the situation. We 
>     prefer not to make public statements based on incomplete information.
> 
>     We apologize to the community for our small part in this unfortunate incident 
>     and assure you that we work very hard to remain good netizens and will 
>     address any concerns promptly when they come to our attention.
> 
> 
>     Sincerely,
> 
>     Lu Heng
>     CEO
>     Cloud Innovations
> 
>     Attached: 
>     1. Letter from Paul Wollner
>     2. Letter from Link Infinity
>     3. LOA Issued to IPDC Solutions for announcing 156.241.3.0/24 from AS134190
>             4.     Letter from IPDC
> 
>     FYI: LARUS is proving IP management service for Cloud Innovation, while LARUS is 
>     also providing IP management service to other third parties in all regions, for full 
>     disclosure, LARUS and Cloud Innovation are headed by same CEO.
> 
>     Content of those letters have been posted here for your convince:
> 
>     IPDC:
> 
> FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE [Perusal of Cloud Innovation Ltd]
> 
> IPDC Solutions Pte Ltd (IPDC) is a customer of Cloud Innovation Ltd and over the course of our corporate 
> relationship we were given the authority to use address block 156.241.3.0/24 since 9th December 2019. 
> 
> On 12th December 2019, we have delegated that address block to our client. Following which our client 
> further instructed us to announce the prefix with AS37353. In good will after minimal verification through 
> WHOIS´ IP Prefix we have proceeded to execute our client´s request. 
> 
> On 7th May 2020 IPDC was then contacted by SEACOM, the legitimate holder of record for that ASN and 
> have since learned that the customer´s use of that ASN was erroneous and not permitted by SEACOM and 
> immediate action has been taken to rectify this situation. 
> 
> IPDC would like to apologize for our lack of attention in conducting thorough verification and wish to 
> highlight that the involvement of Cloud Innovation Ltd in the entire process was providing the addresses to 
> us and that we truly apologize as we understand that this incident may have indirectly implicated Cloud 
> Innovation Ltd. 
> 
> IPDC however, does not wish to disclose our client information and our client information shall remain 
> confidential under present circumstances. Once again, we apologize for our shortcomings. 
> 
> Link Infinity:
> 
> To whom it may concern,
> 
> We at HK Infinity International Ltd are a customer of Cloud Innovation and in the course received rights to 
> use 156.241.3.0/24 from them. Beginning December, 2019, we delegated the right to announce this prefix to 
> IPDC Solutions Pte Ltd. (IPDC). We asked Cloud Innovation to provide an LOA authorizing them to 
> announce the space which was subsequently received. IPDC subsequently and without our knowledge 
> delegated this space to one of their customers and allowed them to originate it from AS37353.
> 
> This announcement was not authorized by us, nor is it permitted by the LOA provided by Cloud Innovation.
> 
> Unfortunately, we were not aware of the situation until after it had already been resolved.
> 
> It was never our intent to violate the LOA or to allow the prefix to be announced from a hijacked ASN. We 
> do not condone this and apologize sincerely to the community for what has happened here.
> 
> Sincere Apologies,
> 
> Paul Wollner:
> 
> 8 May 2020
> 
> TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN                                        
> 
> In the light of the recent email on NAPAfrica mailing list, I would just like to clear the air. 
> 
> The IP route objects were created by myself for Cloud Innovation when they signed up as a client of 
> Macrolan ( now SEACOM) as they didn't have their own AS.
> 
> At the time I was working for Macrolan (now SEACOM). I left the employment of SEACOM in October 
> 2019.
> 
> It appears that when Cloud Innovation's contract with SEACOM came to an end, the route objects were 
> never cleaned up.
> 
> This occurred after I left SEACOM's employment. Since leaving, I have no access to these objects.
> 
> Regards
> 
> Paul Wollner
> 082-786-9776
>     To whom it may concern, 
> 
>     On May 8, Mark Think posted a claim to multiple lists that Cloud Innovation was 
>     abusing an ASN (37353) that didn´t belong to them (Cloud Innovation) but rather 
>     belonged to Seacom through their acquisition of MacroLAN.
> 
>     While we regret this unfortunate incident, Mark´s claims that it was criminal or bad 
>     netizenship on the part of Cloud Innovation is without foundation and utterly incorrect.
> 
>     As shown below in the attached document from Paul Wollner(Ex-CTO of 
>     Macrolan who created IRR routes to allow Macrolan to announce Cloud 
>     Innovation's prefix); letter from Link Infinity International Ltd. (Link Infinity), A 
>     customer of Cloud Innovation; and attached LOA from LARUS authorizing 
>     IPDC Solutions to announce the prefix with origin AS134190.  And a Letter 
>     from IPDC. This was an innocent mistake committed by third parties and had 
>     nothing to do with any action by Cloud Innovation or LARUS.
> 
>     Here´s what happened:
> 
>     Cloud Innovation delegated a /24 to Link Infinity, an ISP in December 
>     2019.
> 
>     Link Infinity further delegated that same /24 to IPDC and asked Cloud innovation 
>     to issue an LOA, which we did. The LOA specifically required IPDC to use its 
>     own ASN to announce the space (AS134190).
> 
>     IPDC subsequently authorized one of its customers to use the said 
>     prefix.
> 
>     For reasons still unknown to Cloud Innovation, IPDC and their customer 
>     set up a BGP session wherein their customer used AS37353 as the 
>     origin to advertise prefix 156.241.3.0/24.
> 
>     Upon discovering the announcement, rather than contact Cloud 
>     Innovation, Mark contacted IPDC who provided him with an incomplete 
>     explanation blaming their customer and Mark, not realizing that Cloud 
>     Innovation was not the customer in question posted far and wide about 
>     the event. It is unclear to us why he chose to do this rather than contact 
>     us to try and resolve the issue.
> 
>     A contributing factor to the erroneous BGP configuration by IPDC's customer 
>     may have been data contained in some outdated IRR route objects 
>     for 156.241.0.0/16 which have subsequently been deleted.
> 
>     As soon as we became aware of the problem (via Mark´s email), we began to 
>     investigate the situation. As soon as it was clear that this was the result of 
>     third-party actions, we reached out to Mark privately to let him know what we 
>     knew and that we were still investigating. We delayed making a public 
>     statement in order to try and ascertain all of the facts of the situation. We 
>     prefer not to make public statements based on incomplete information.
> 
>     We apologize to the community for our small part in this unfortunate incident 
>     and assure you that we work very hard to remain good netizens and will 
>     address any concerns promptly when they come to our attention.
> 
> 
>     Sincerely,
> 
>     Lu Heng
>     CEO
>     Cloud Innovations
> 
>     Attached: 
>     1. Letter from Paul Wollner
>     2. Letter from Link Infinity
>     3. LOA Issued to IPDC Solutions for announcing 156.241.3.0/24 from AS134190
>             4.     Letter from IPDC
> 
>     FYI: LARUS is proving IP management service for Cloud Innovation, while LARUS is 
>     also providing IP management service to other third parties in all regions, for full 
>     disclosure, LARUS and Cloud Innovation are headed by same CEO.
> 
>     Content of those letters have been posted here for your convince:
> 
>     IPDC:
> 
> FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE [Perusal of Cloud Innovation Ltd]
> 
> IPDC Solutions Pte Ltd (IPDC) is a customer of Cloud Innovation Ltd and over the course of our corporate 
> relationship we were given the authority to use address block 156.241.3.0/24 since 9th December 2019. 
> 
> On 12th December 2019, we have delegated that address block to our client. Following which our client 
> further instructed us to announce the prefix with AS37353. In good will after minimal verification through 
> WHOIS´ IP Prefix we have proceeded to execute our client´s request. 
> 
> On 7th May 2020 IPDC was then contacted by SEACOM, the legitimate holder of record for that ASN and 
> have since learned that the customer´s use of that ASN was erroneous and not permitted by SEACOM and 
> immediate action has been taken to rectify this situation. 
> 
> IPDC would like to apologize for our lack of attention in conducting thorough verification and wish to 
> highlight that the involvement of Cloud Innovation Ltd in the entire process was providing the addresses to 
> us and that we truly apologize as we understand that this incident may have indirectly implicated Cloud 
> Innovation Ltd. 
> 
> IPDC however, does not wish to disclose our client information and our client information shall remain 
> confidential under present circumstances. Once again, we apologize for our shortcomings. 
> 
> Link Infinity:
> 
> To whom it may concern,
> 
> We at HK Infinity International Ltd are a customer of Cloud Innovation and in the course received rights to 
> use 156.241.3.0/24 from them. Beginning December, 2019, we delegated the right to announce this prefix to 
> IPDC Solutions Pte Ltd. (IPDC). We asked Cloud Innovation to provide an LOA authorizing them to 
> announce the space which was subsequently received. IPDC subsequently and without our knowledge 
> delegated this space to one of their customers and allowed them to originate it from AS37353.
> 
> This announcement was not authorized by us, nor is it permitted by the LOA provided by Cloud Innovation.
> 
> Unfortunately, we were not aware of the situation until after it had already been resolved.
> 
> It was never our intent to violate the LOA or to allow the prefix to be announced from a hijacked ASN. We 
> do not condone this and apologize sincerely to the community for what has happened here.
> 
> Sincere Apologies,
> 
> Paul Wollner:
> 
> 8 May 2020
> 
> TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN                                        
> 
> In the light of the recent email on NAPAfrica mailing list, I would just like to clear the air. 
> 
> The IP route objects were created by myself for Cloud Innovation when they signed up as a client of 
> Macrolan ( now SEACOM) as they didn't have their own AS.
> 
> At the time I was working for Macrolan (now SEACOM). I left the employment of SEACOM in October 
> 2019.
> 
> It appears that when Cloud Innovation's contract with SEACOM came to an end, the route objects were 
> never cleaned up.
> 
> This occurred after I left SEACOM's employment. Since leaving, I have no access to these objects.
> 
> Regards
> 
> Paul Wollner
> 082-786-9776
> 
>     On Fri, 8 May 2020 at 22:08, Mark Tinka <mark.tinka at seacom.mu> wrote:
>     Hi all.
>     
>     I'm not one to b**ch & moan in public, but per subject, I could not let this one 
>     slide.
>     
>     And if you get this from multiple mailing lists, apologies for that - I'm just trying 
>     to make sure that this reaches as wide an audience as possible, on the 
>     continent.
>     
>     SEACOM (AS37100) acquired MacroLan (AS37353) a couple of years ago. 
>     MacroLan is now part of the SEACOM family, and while we are in the process of 
>     integrating that network into AS37100, some existing services continue to be 
>     delivered on AS37353 until that exercise is completed.
>     
>     One of the customers that AS37353 was providing services to was Cloud 
>     Innovation, in Cape Town. From a routing perspective, because Cloud 
>     Innovation had no AS number for this service, all of their IP address space was 
>     being originated by AS37353, on their behalf.
>     
>     In December of 2019, AS37353 ceased providing services to Cloud Innovation. 
>     That is 6 months ago.
>     
>     In recent days, it came to SEACOM's attention that some of Cloud Innovation's 
>     IP address space was being originated by AS37353 - specifically, 
>     156.241.3.0/24 - even though we were sure that they were no longer a 
>     customer of AS37353 since December of 2019. At first, we thought this was a 
>     cached entry in a number of popular looking glasses, but then every looking 
>     glass had the same entry, which made this an unlikely bug.
>     
>     As of yesterday afternoon, see below what Telia's looking glass was saying 
>     about this prefix:
>     
>     *****
>     
>     Path #1: Received by speaker 0
>       4809 134190 37353
>         2.255.249.42 (metric 2134) from 2.255.253.101 (80.91.242.40)
>           Origin incomplete, localpref 200, valid, internal, best, group-best, import-candidate
>     Communities:
>     
>     1299:431
>         (RPKI state Unknown)
>     
>     1299:1000 1299:30000 1299:30600 23456:20413 45352:4500 45352:9204
>     
>     *****
>     
>     But when I run a traceroute from my house to that prefix, it clearly was not 
>     ending up in Cape Town, where AS37353's main operation resides:
>     
>     *****
>     
>     MacBook-Pro-7:~ tinka$ traceroute -I 156.241.3.1
>     traceroute to 156.241.3.1 (156.241.3.1), 64 hops max, 72 byte packets
>      1  172.16.0.254 (172.16.0.254)  14.824 ms  11.522 ms  3.525 ms
>      2  xe-1-3-0-1064.er-01-jnb.za.seacomnet.com (105.22.37.13)  5.620 ms  9.714 ms  9.887 
>     ms
>      3  ce-0-2-0-0.cr-02-jnb.za.seacomnet.com (105.16.28.2)  175.232 ms  172.699 ms  
>     175.896 ms
>      4  xe-0-0-0-8.cr-02-cpt.za.seacomnet.com (105.16.9.182)  164.496 ms  163.578 ms  
>     163.546 ms
>      5  105.16.14.153 (105.16.14.153)  169.812 ms  171.272 ms  177.115 ms
>      6  xe-0-0-0-0.br-02-lhr.uk.seacomnet.com (105.16.34.253)  168.911 ms  172.958 ms  
>     165.165 ms
>      7  82.112.115.169 (82.112.115.169)  172.700 ms  176.482 ms  174.375 ms
>      8  ae-17.r05.londen12.uk.bb.gin.ntt.net (129.250.2.147)  672.099 ms  613.617 ms  
>     615.109 ms
>      9  ae-2.r24.londen12.uk.bb.gin.ntt.net (129.250.4.244)  181.952 ms  183.087 ms  187.302 
>     ms
>     10  ae-16.r20.frnkge13.de.bb.gin.ntt.net (129.250.3.13)  190.511 ms  185.579 ms  
>     187.058 ms
>     11  ae-3.r20.sngpsi07.sg.bb.gin.ntt.net (129.250.4.17)  520.882 ms  613.982 ms  
>     615.275 ms
>     12  ae-9.r24.tkokhk01.hk.bb.gin.ntt.net (129.250.7.67)  612.301 ms  586.886 ms  
>     436.711 ms
>     13  ae-1.r03.tkokhk01.hk.bb.gin.ntt.net (129.250.6.98)  614.470 ms  613.416 ms  
>     614.281 ms
>     14  ce-0-3-0-3.r03.tkokhk01.hk.ce.gin.ntt.net (203.131.241.126)  614.128 ms  613.661 
>     ms  615.416 ms
>     15  * *     *
>     16  * * *
>     17  156.241.3.1 (156.241.3.1)  494.400 ms  410.180 ms *
>     MacBook-Pro-7:~ tinka$
>     
>     *****
>     
>     So we, then, realized that this was a fraudulent use of MacroLan's AS37353, to 
>     which we had given no express permission.
>     
>     As luck would have it, due to my days living and working in Malaysia, I know 
>     the good folk that operate AS134190 (IPDC Solutions), who was the upstream 
>     providing transit for this prefix. So I rang them up yesterday afternoon, told 
>     them what was happening, and within the hour, they got that eBGP session 
>     shutdown. I am most grateful to them for their quick response and immediate 
>     understanding of what was going on. Even with all the technology we have 
>     today, it, many times, comes down to having good friends in good places.
>     
>     Anyway, it turns out the ISP that had acquired this prefix from Cloud Innovation 
>     is based in Manila, Philippines. When IPDC delivered their transit service to 
>     them in Manila, that ISP informed them that they should use AS37353 for the 
>     eBGP session. Yes, one could argue that IPDC should have done their checks to 
>     ensure that the AS number being provided by their customer belongs to them, 
>     but to be honest, I'm not too bothered about that compared to Cloud 
>     Innovation's thinking that it was okay to use another network's AS number in 
>     order to deliver their services to their customers.
>     
>     IPDC confirm that this service was activated for the Manila ISP in December of 
>     2019, right around the time Cloud Innovation's service with SEACOM, in Cape 
>     Town, ended.
>     
>     As it currently stands, the ISP in Manila is now off the Internet, with some 12 
>     paying customers currently without service. Their excuse - they do not have an 
>     AS number of their own.
>     
>     IPDC tried to find out why the ISP in Manila thought that it was okay to use 
>     another network's AS number for their service, and as it turns out, the network 
>     engineer at the Manila ISP that set this up has since left the company. All the 
>     ones currently there do not have any history about all of this.
>     
>     Currently, 156.241.3.0/24 is not in the global BGP table:
>     
>     *****
>     
>     lg-01-ams.nl>sh ip bgp 156.241.3.0/24
>     % Network not in table
>     lg-01-ams.nl>
>     
>     lg-01-nbo.ke>sh ip bgp 156.241.3.0/24
>     % Network not in table
>     lg-01-nbo.ke>
>     
>     lg-01-cpt.za>sh ip bgp 156.241.3.0/24
>     % Network not in table
>     lg-01-cpt.za>
>     
>     *****
>     
>     That Cloud Innovation thought it was okay for them to use MacroLan's AS 
>     number to originate their own prefixes into the global BGP is as morally 
>     reprehensible as it is technologically distasteful.
>     
>     SEACOM have been working very closely with AFRINIC to delete previous route 
>     objects from their IRR that certify a relationship between Cloud Innovation's 
>     parent /16 aggregates that cover this prefix, and AS37353, but this is one of 
>     those objects that cannot be removed via the MyAFRINIC portal, and requires 
>     manual intervention from AFRINIC.
>     
>     I have not, personally, spoken to the proprietors of Cloud Innovation and/or 
>     Outside Heaven, as I don't see how anything could explain this with any degree 
>     of justification.
>     
>     For now, I will find some beer to wipe the foul taste from my mouth, while we 
>     (SEACOM) consider what to do about this.
>     
>     And yes, for those who are wondering, RPKI's ROV would not have prevented 
>     this, in its current form. This is AS hijacking, and ROV, today, tries to solve the 
>     prefix-hijacking problem, first.
>     
>     Thank you for your attention.
>     
>     Mark.
>     _______________________________________________
>     Community-Discuss mailing list
>     Community-Discuss at afrinic.net
>     https://lists.afrinic.net/mailman/listinfo/community-discuss
> 
>     --
>     --
>     Kind regards.
>     Lu
> 
> 
>     
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>     Community-Discuss mailing list
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