[AfrICANN-discuss] On phishing, IPv6 flaw et la Fraude a l'annuaire sur les ccTLDs

Anne-Rachel Inné annerachel at gmail.com
Fri May 11 12:53:14 SAST 2007

 *par Nicolas SIMONIN*
nicolas.simonin at indom.com

*Le .CA dénonce une fraude à l'annuaire.*

*Après la France, le Canada est aujourd'hui la cible de Deutscher
Adressdienst GmbH, une société allemande proposant à un tarif très coûteux
votre inscription dans un annuaire "officiel".*

•  *Combien de .CA aujourd'hui ?*
On compte 833 958 .CA enregistrés au 7 mai 2007

  Nous vous avions alerté des agissements d'une société allemande qui, en
échange de 960€<http://www.domainesinfo.fr/actualite/1180/un-annuaire-a-prix-d-or.php>,
proposait aux internautes français d'intégrer un "soit disant" annuaire
professionnel du registre français.

Cette même société s'attaque depuis peu au territoire canadien par courrier
postal. Le registre du .CA a pris l'initiative de lancer un message d'alerte
pour informer ses internautes du caractère douteux de ces courriers.

L'Autorité canadienne pour les enregistrements Internet (ACEI) demande aux
titulaires de .CA de ne pas répondre aux lettres, aux fax ou aux autres
communications provenant de la firme DAD Deutscher Adressdienst GmbH, une
entreprise allemande qui opère sous la bannière trompeuse de "Registre
Internet du Canada" (Canadian Internet Registry). Cette dénomination
rappelle bien sûr celle de "Registre Internet français"
pour tromper le public français.

*1457$ de frais d'inscription à un annuaire !*

Les lettres ou fax en français sont envoyés à des titulaires de .CA sous le
prétexte de mettre à jour leurs enregistrements de noms de domaine. Il
s'agit d'un stratagème visant à inciter les titulaires à acheter un ensemble
de services marketing, au coût de 1 457 $.

* Affaire à suivre...*

L'ACEI met donc en garde ses titulaires et leur déconseille fortement de
fournir tout renseignement ou de verser tout paiement à cette entreprise.
Elle a porté cette affaire à l'attention des autorités policières et
continuera à tenir les titulaires de noms de domaine en .CA au courant des
développements dans cette affaire.

 Publié le lundi 7 mai 2007
 *Les liens de l'article* - Vérifiez la disponibilité d'un .CA ?
  Copyright (c) *DomainesInfo*. Tous droits réservés. Imprimé le 11/05/2007

 The Phisher King - http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=123671
   The Phisher King

MAY 9, 2007 | You see phishing attack attempts nearly every day, but what
you don't see is the face behind the attack. In a rare glimpse into the mind
of a phisher, hacker and security expert RSnake recently engaged an attacker
who says he makes $3,000 to $4,000 dollars a day and was willing to
bit about himself and how he operates.

RSnake, a.k.a. Robert Hansen, CEO of SecTheory and *Dark
asked the phisher, called "lithium," how he operates, what
technology he uses, and just how much money he makes off these scams.
Lithium, who says he's 18 and has been phishing since he was 14, said he has
stolen over 20 million identities, mostly via social networking worms. "I
have so many hundreds of thousands of accounts to many websites I haven't
even got a chance to look through," he wrote to RSnake, who today published
the responses on the ha.ckers.org blog.

While RSnake admitted he can't verify all of lithium's actual numbers, he
said in response to comments on his ha.ckers blog that the phisher's story
"jives" with that of traditional phishers.

RSnake also confirms that lithium is an actual phisher: "I found one of his
old phishing sites," RSnake says. "I can't comment on the numbers, but yes,
he was definitely really a social networking phisher."

Lithium says he got interested in phishing after realizing the scam emails
his parents were getting were weak, but still basically worked. "So, I knew
automatically I could come up with more efficient methods and have a far
greater outcome."

Lithium only phishes about three or four times a week, and he targets social
networking sites, mostly those frequented by the teen crowd. "5 times out of
10 the person uses the same password for their email account," he wrote.
"Now depending what is inside their email inbox determines how much more
profit I make. If an email account has one of the following
paypal/egold/rapidshare/ebay accounts even the email account itself, I sell
those to scammers."

The phisher said he typically tries to locate a domain name that looks
"realistic" to the target, and then finds an anonymous host, typically
offshore. "Although, I do tend to use compromised hosting accounts," he
wrote. "Secondly, I view the page source. Then I alter the source code to
post the forms information to my pishing [*sic*] site. Thirdly, I create a
php file which will POST the current forms information to a text file on my
server. I use the same php file with every site...Just minor alterations are
needed since it's mearly [*sic*] a few lines of php code."

RSnake asked him how many people he typically phishes per day. Depending on
the size of the Website, lithium said, it's usually about 30,000.

HD Moore, director of security research for BreakingPoint Systems, says
while lithium does match the typical profile of phishers, his "numbers seem
a little on the high side."

Plus, lithium's days as a phisher could be numbered if he isn't careful.
"Running a phishing site attracts attention -- it has to, or it won't work.
Bragging about how much money you make is a sure sign you are going to get
busted in the near future," Moore says.

Using freelance programmers is also a liability, Moore notes. "If any of
them get audited on where their money comes from, you can bet they would
turn over this guy in a heartbeat."

Lithium, meanwhile, told RSnake he uses a dedicated server, VPN, network
encryption software, and a 1-Mbit/s ADSL line. Tool-wise, the phisher said
he uses MyChanger for most social networking sites: "This makes pishing [*
sic*] so much faster on social networking sites. Everything is automated!
messaging/bulletins/comments/profile modifications it's great. Other than
that, I get ALOT [*sic*] of custom programs built to suite [*sic*] my needs
from freelance developers," he wrote.

How does he remain in the shadows? "I use VPN's, Dedicated servers, Proxies
and my network traffic is encrypted. All payments are made through egold."

Interestingly, he admitted Internet Explorer 7 and Firefox 2.0's
anti-phishing filters "cause the most irritation" of phishing deterrents
available today.

But security experts say not much seems to hurt lithium and other phishers
in the end. It's still always a game of catch-up for the good guys, says
Jeremiah Grossman, founder and CTO of WhiteHat Security. "Microsoft and
Mozilla spend years figuring out a workable solution, then a short time
later, it's all for not. Bad guys can adapt a lot faster than the good guys,
which is why our job is so much harder."

And the wealth of Web application bugs is keeping lithium in business -- for
now, anyway: "Lazy web developers are the reason I'm still around pishing,"
lithium wrote.

— Kelly Jackson Higgins, Senior Editor, *Dark
BreakingPoint Systems<http://www.darkreading.com/complink_redirect.asp?vl_id=9560>
WhiteHat Security<http://www.darkreading.com/complink_redirect.asp?vl_id=9014>
(c) 2000-2007 Light Reading Inc. - All rights reserved.

Experts scramble to quash IPv6 flaw
Robert Lemos, SecurityFocus 2007-05-09

A flawed feature that could amplify denial-of-service attacks on
next-generation networks has vendors and engineers rushing to eliminate the
potential security issue.

This week, experts sent two drafts to the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF)--the technical standards-setting body for the Internet -- proposing
different ways of fixing a problem
<http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/23615>in the way that Internet
Protocol version 6 (IPv6) allows the source of
network data to determine its path through the network. The drafts recommend
that the IPv6 feature should either be eliminated or, at the very least,
disabled by default.

The specification, known as the Type 0 Routing Header (RH0), allows
computers to tell IPv6 routers to send data by a specific route. Originally
envisioned as a way to let mobile users to retain a single IP for their
devices, the feature has significant security implications. During a
presentation at the CanSecWest conference on April 18, researchers Philippe
Biondi and Arnaud Ebalard pointed out that RH0 support allows attackers to
amplify denial-of-service attacks on IPv6 infrastructure by a factor of at
least 80.

"In rough terms, it makes everything we thought was bad, a thousand times
worse," Paul Vixie, president of the Internet Systems
said in an e-mail interview with SecurityFocus. "It can be exploited by any
greedy Estonian teenager with a $300 Linux machine."

The security issues comes as more organizations are making the switch to
IPv6 from the current Internet routing standard (IPv4). The U.S. federal
government and many major corporations are transitioning to the standard by
the end of the decade. The U.S. Department of Defense and the White House's
Office of Management and Budget have mandated that the military services and
federal agencies move their backbone
IPv6 by June 30, 2008.

However, the standard is already widely supported by routers and operating
systems. Apple's Mac OS X, the Linux operating systems, and Microsoft's
next-generation operating system, Vista, uses the standard as the default
networking protocol. Microsoft supports wrapping IPv6 packets inside of IPv4
data, known as 6to4 tunneling, so that networks sending data using IPv6 can
communicate across the Internet, but attackers could use the technique to send
covert data <http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/427>.

The RH0 security issues has its roots in the current Internet protocol
implementation. The specification for IPv4 allows the sender of data to
specify one or more routers through which the data must travel. Known as
source routing, the technique allows up to 9 other addresses to be included
in an IPv4's extended header, requesting that the packet be routed through
those specific addresses. While source routing can be beneficial for
diagnostics, it can also be used to amplify a denial-of-service attack by a
factor of 10 by alternating two target Internet addresses in the header,
ping-ponging the data between two machines.

While source routing has been accepted as a bad security risk by most
companies and most routers disable the feature by default, the IETF has not
eliminated the option from the specification and extended it to IPv6.

"IPv6 is really neat, but I think we are going to see a number of these
gotchas because it is still so new," said Jose Nazario, senior security
researcher with Arbor Networks. "It will likely shake out over the next
couple of years."

Under IPv6, the impact of allowing users to specify some of the addresses to
which data must be sent, known as loose source routing, is more dire.
Because more addresses can be included in the header, rather than magnifying
an attack by 10, Biondi and Ebalard calculated that it could amplify attacks
by a factor of 88. In addition, RH0 also could allow an attacker to dodge a
distributed technology, known as AnyCast, for protecting the 13 DNS root
servers from attack and could be used to create a backlog of packets that
could spike traffic to a server at a specific time.

"It is exactly that: The reintroduction of the IPv4 loose source routing
mechanism in the IPv6 world and on steroids," said a network engineer that
asked not to be identified.

The IETF reaction may have set a new speed record for the standards-setting
body. With engineers arguing technical merits and peer-reviewing others'
work while vendors push their specific requirements, the IETF is not known
for making quick decisions.

Yet, after debating the issue since the CanSecWest presentation, engineers
have published two proposals: get
the feature or make everyone turn
it off <http://www.netcore.fi/pekkas/ietf/draft-savola-ipv6-rtheader-00.txt>unless
its really needed.

"In practice it, it will be disabled, whether it gets left around for future
usage, that's up in the air," said Robert Hinden, co-chair of the IPv6
Working Group for the IETF and a Nokia Fellow at the networking and phone

Yet, companies and the engineering group responsible for a large portion of
the IPv6 routing code have moved quickly to disable the feature. By late
April, the Kame Project, which has created the code used in many flavors of
the BSD operating system as well as routers, had disabled the Type 0 Routing
Header in its own code.

"They don't just avoid walking the RH0 header, but they also now drop
packets that contain it," said Theo de Raadt, project leader for OpenBSD.

Cisco has issued a security
the issue. Both Cisco and Juniper declined to provide a representative
discuss the issue.

Because IPv6 has not been fully deployed in most networks, it will likely
only take two or three years for almost all Internet service providers to
fix the issues, de Raadt said.

ISC's Vixie agreed that the problem should be almost completely eliminated
in three years.

"I'd say in three years this will be a footnote," Vixie said.

Privacy Statement <http://www.securityfocus.com/privacy>
Copyright 2006, SecurityFocus
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